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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the effect of ownership structure on firms leverage and the 
sensitivity of a firm's investment to its cash flow, respectively. First ownership 
structure's impact on leverage is tested using a sample of 1488 firms from nine East 
Asian economies. Evidence indicates that firms with higher separation of cash flow 
rights from control rights (in the hands of the largest shareholder) tend to have higher 
leverage ratio. Moreover, the leverage ratio is lower in countries with better 
protection of creditor rights and enforcement of law. A positive relationship between 
the separation of cash flow rights to control rights and the sensitivity of a firm's 
investment to its cash flow among corporations in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand is also documented in this thesis. In sum, this thesis shows evidence that 
supports the fact that, the separation of ownership from control is easy to lead to a 
more risky capital structure, which may deepen the financial distress after the 
financial crisis in East Asian Corporations. Also, the risk of expropriation of 
minority shareholders by large and controlling shareholders is an important 
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In recent years, a lot of research has been done on corporate ownership structures. 
Previous researchers documented that, ownership structures exhibit relatively little 
concentration in the United States. However, most East Asian firms show a sharp 
divergence between cash flow rights and control rights in the hands of the largest 
shareholder. These findings have important implications for the ability and incentives 
of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. 
Purpose 
This thesis investigates the impact of ownership structures on leverage and 
investment-cash flow sensitivity of East Asian corporations. The objective of this 
thesis is to check whether such a kind of ownership structure among East Asian 
corporations has some effects on firms' capital structure and investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, which may provide us with insights into the reason of financial distress 
for some East Asian firms after the South East Asia financial crisis. 
Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Using data from nine East Asian Economies, namely, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, first this 
thesis want to seek evidence about ownership structures' impact on firm leverage 
when there is a large deviation of control rights from cash-flow rights in the 
corporations. Two hypotheses are mainly considered in the empirical analysis. 
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The first hypothesis states that, the controlling shareholders may need to conduct 
investment and expand the business scope, and will thus need to raise new funds. 
They may increase debt because raising debt will not dilute the controlling position 
of their shareholding in the corporation. They can still keep the shareholding 
dominance. In this sense, it is predicted that debt tends to increase with the degree of 
separation between control and cash-flow rights. 
In contrast, the second hypothesis argues, if financial distress is really a concern, the 
controlling shareholder may reduce debt-financing and rely more on equity financing 
or internal financing. So, when there is a large deviation between ownership and 
control, the controlling shareholder may resist the role of debt in corporate 
governance. From the perspective of entrenchment, they will like to reduce the 
leverage and debt level, which suggests a negative effect between firm leverage and 
the degree of separation between control and cash-flow rights. 
Using regression techniques, this empirical thesis finds that firms with higher 
separation of cash-flow rights and control rights (in the hands of the largest 
shareholder) tend to have higher leverage ratio. Moreover, when considering the 
influence of variation of investor protection among different countries, the leverage 
ratio is lower in countries with better protection of creditor rights and enforcement of 
law. 
The influence of separation between ownership and control on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is then evaluated in chapter 5，using data from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. There are two possible outcomes. 
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The first possible outcome is mainly based on the free cash flow theory, which says 
that the separation between ownership and control may create disincentive effect. If 
corporate insiders tend to misuse the corporate liquidity for their personal benefits or 
benefits of other related companies controlled by the insiders, then a higher fixed 
investment sensitivity to cash flow for companies with a higher separation between 
ownership and control can be observed. 
Another explanation for this outcome is from the perspective of the cost of external 
financing, relying more on internal finance can also contribute to a high sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow. If minority shareholders are fearful of being expropriated in 
a corporation with a high degree of separation between ownership and control, they 
will be reluctant to contribute equity investment. Then it is more costly to raise 
external finance. Debt financing is another source of external financing; however, if 
controlling insider is fearful of losing control in debt default, they will depress debt 
financing. 
The second possible outcome is based on the asymmetric information theory. When 
separation between ownership and control is lower, the controlling insider is more 
likely to act in the interests of minority shareholders when making a financing choice. 
Then, the relationship of investment to cash flow would be less sensitive to the 
separation of ownership from control. 
The empirical result provides support for the free cash flow theory: a larger 
separation between cash flow rights and control rights, hence, a larger agency cost of 




The organization of this study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
literature review. The next chapter describes the data. Chapter 4 investigates the 
empirical evidence of the ownership structures' effects on firms' leverage. Chapter 5 
studies ownership structures' effects on investment-cash flow sensitivity. The 
conclusion and implications are given in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THEORIES AND LITERATURE 
The Literature on Ownership Structures 
There exist a number of case studies that describe the ownership and control 
structures of some of the largest business groups in East Asian countries. For 
example, Taylor (1998) for the Li Ka-shing group in Hong Kong, Okumura (1993) 
for the Mitsubishi group in Japan, Numazaki (1993) for the Tainanbang group in 
Taiwan, etc. These case studies provide us with insights into the evolution of 
corporate ownership and control in East Asia. However, the case study literature 
does not document the precise mechanisms through which the owners are able to 
exercise and extend their control. And cross-country analysis is also rare among the 
case study literature. 
In recent years, a lot of research has been done on corporate ownership structures to 
fill this gap in our knowledge. For example, La Porta, et al. (1999) produced data on 
ownership structures of large corporations in twenty-seven wealthy economies and 
found that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively 
few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of 
ownership of the modem corporation.' The controlling shareholders typically have 
1 In their 1932 classic, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means 
call attention to the prevalence of widely held corporations in the United States, in which 
ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders, yet control is concentrated in the 
hands of managers. For at least two generations, their book has fixed the image of the modem 
corporation as one run by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders. The book 
stimulated an enormous "managerialist" literature on the objectives of such managers. More 
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the power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily 
through the use of pyramids and participation in management. The results suggest 
that the principal-agent problem in large corporations around the world is a problem 
of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, 
rather than restricting empire building by professional managers unaccountable to 
shareholders. Claessens, et al. (2000) examined the separation of ownership and 
control for corporations in nine East Asian economies. They got results consistent 
with La Porta, et al. (1999)，that is, in the nine economies, voting rights frequently 
exceed cash-flow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.^ They even 
found that the separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among 
family-controlled firms. A single shareholder controls more than two-thirds of firms. 
Managers of closely held firms tend to be relatives of the controlling shareholder's 
family. Older firms are generally family-controlled, dispelling the notion that 
ownership becomes dispersed over time. Significant corporate wealth in East Asia is 
concentrated among a few families. 
Also, La Porta, et al. (2002) found evidence of higher valuation of firms with higher 
cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder. Again, the result is consistent 
recently, the modem field of corporate finance has developed around the same image of a widely 
held corporation, as can be seen in the central contributions of Jensen and Meckling (1976) or 
Grossman and Hart (1980). 
2 Pyramid structures are defined as owning a majority of the stock of one corporation, 
which in turn holds a majority of the stock of another, a process that can be repeated a number of 
times. Cross-holdings refer to horizontal and vertical ownership links among corporations that 
can enhance the control of a large, ultimate shareholder. A company further down the chain of 
control through cross-holding has some shares in another company in the same business group. 
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with Claessens, et al. (2002), which documented that, firm value increases with the 
cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive 
effect, but firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed 
its cash-flow rights, consistent with an entrenchment effect. 
Large shareholders have strong incentives to maximize their firms' value and are 
able to collect information and oversee managers, and so can help overcome one of 
the principal-agent problems in the modem corporation emphasized by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)，the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers. Large 
shareholders also have strong incentives to exert pressure on managers or even to 
replace them through a proxy fight or a takeover.3 However, the presence of large 
investors may bring costs to the company. According to Shleifer and Vishny, "Large 
investors may represent their own interests, which need not coincide with the 
interests of other investors in the firm, or with the interests of employees and 
managers" (1997, p.758). 
Theoretical Explanations for Capital Structure 
After the celebrated paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958), many papers in the field 
of capital structure were brought to us. Among these papers, the relationship between 
capital structure and corporate control is also one academic focus, and has been 
investigated extensively. Specifically, the role of managerial ownership received 
special attention. However, less work has been done on leverage associated with the 
3 As Shleifer and Vishny pointed out, "Large shareholders thus address the agency problem 
in that they have both a general interest in profit maximization, and enough control over the 
assets of the firm to have their interest respected" (1997.p.754). 
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separation of ownership from control and the presence of large controlling 
shareholders. 
As we have mentioned above, when there is a large deviation of control rights from 
cash-flow rights in the corporation, the potential expropriation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders might happen at the same time, although the 
corporate governance is strengthened by concentrated ownership. In this context, we 
will investigate empirically the determinants of the firms' capital structure based on 
the well known optimal capital structure theories, namely the taxed based theory, the 
agency theory and the signaling theory. The following are some theoretical models of 
capital structure. 
Tax-Based Model 
The tax-based theory hypothesizes that firms choose their debt-equity ratio by 
trading off the benefits from tax reduction on interest payments against the costs of 
financial distress due to accumulating more debt. The implication of this model is 
that, debt financing has a major benefit for the firm because it helps the firm reduce 
corporate tax payments. The tax effects on financing decisions are examined 
following the non-debt tax shields argument of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). They 
argue that firms can use other non-interest item such as depreciation, tax credit, and 
pension funds to get corporate tax deduction. Therefore, leverage is theoretically 
supposed to be negatively correlated with firms' non-debt tax shields level. 
On the other hand, when firms are not runned by the investors who supply capital to 
the firms, two problems exist. Here I try to describe them basing on two models: 
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Models Based on Agency Costs 
The theoretical literature in the models in which capital structure is determined by 
agency costs, i.e., costs of investigation is abundant. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
initiated this research building on work of Fama and Miller (1972). They identified 
two types of conflicts: conflicts between debt holders and equity holders, and 
conflicts between shareholders and managers. 
Conflicts between Debt Holders and Equity Holders 
According to Harris and Raviv (1991)，“conflicts between debt holders and equity 
holders arise because the debt contract gives equity holders an incentive to invest 
sub-optimally.” However, when debt holders can correctly anticipate equity holder's future 
behavior when debt is issued, equity holders bear this cost to debt holders. If this is the case, 
the equity holders receive less for the debt than they otherwise would. As a result, the 
incentive to invest in value-decreasing projects created by debt will decrease because the 
equity holders now bear the cost. This effect is generally called the "asset substitution 
effect," it is an agency cost of debt financing. 
As Jensen and Meckling pointed out, an optimal capital structure could be obtained 
by trading off the agency cost of debt against the benefit of debt. For example, many 
researchers have pointed out that agency problems can be reduced or eliminated 
through the use of managerial incentive schemes and/or more complicated financial 
securities such as convertible debt. 
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Conflicts between Shareholders and Managers 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976)，when managers hold less than 100% of the 
residual claim, they have to bear the entire cost of their profit enhancement activities, but 
they do not capture the entire gain from these activities. Thus, managers may not put as 
much effort as he can in managing firm resources. One way to reduce this kind of 
inefficiency is to let managers own more fraction of the firm's equity. As a result, when the 
absolute investment in the firm is held constant, the increase of debt financing in a firm can 
increases the manager's share of the equity and mitigate the loss from the conflict between 
the manager and shareholders. 
What's more, Jensen (1986) pointed out that, since debt commits the firm to pay out 
cash, the amount of "free" cash available to managers to engage in the type of 
pursuits mentioned above is largely reduced. Thus, this mitigation of the conflicts 
between managers and equity holders constitutes the benefit of debt financing.'' 
Models Based on Asymmetric Information 
Among theories that explain capital structure through the modeling of private 
information, one branch of research insists that the choice of firm's capital structure 
signals to outside investors the information of insiders. Another branch starts with 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). This branch of literature thinks capital 
structure is designed to mitigate inefficiency in the firm's investment decisions that 
4 Grossman and Hart (1982) pointed out another benefit of debt financing. I f bankruptcy is 
costly for managers, perhaps because they lose benefits of control or reputation, then debt can 
create an incentive for managers to work harder, consume fewer perquisites, and make better 
investment decisions, etc., because this behavior reduces the probability of bankruptcy. 
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are caused by the information asymmetry. 
The Pecking Order Theory 
According to Myers and Majluf s pioneering work (1984)，equity may be mispriced 
by the market when there is difficulty for investors to get the firm information. Thus, 
firms using equity financing will result in a net loss to the existing shareholder when 
underpricing is severe. In this case, the firm can finance a new project through other 
channels, say, using a security that is not so severely undervalued by the market. 
Myers (1984) refers to this as a "pecking order" theory of financing, that is, firms 
end up having a financial hierarchy. First they use their retained earnings, and then 
move to riskless debt when they are running out of internal fund. Equity financing is 
used only when firms have no more debt capacity. 
Signaling with Proportion of Debt 
A large number of models show that companies choose their debt priority and 
maturity to signal to the market their quality. One important contribution in this area 
is that of Ross (1977). In his model, asymmetric information problem exists. 
Investors do not know the true distribution of firm returns, but managers do. When 
the firm's securities are more highly valued by the market, managers benefit. But if 
the firm goes bankrupt, managers will be penalized. Larger debt level can often be 
used as a signal to the outside investors o show that, the firm is of good quality and 
creditors do not need to worry about their debt.^  Since low quality firms have higher 
marginal expected bankruptcy costs for any debt level, managers of low quality firms 
5 Ravid and sarig (1989) consider a combination of debt and dividend commitment. They 
show that both dividends and debt level increase wit firm quality. 
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do not imitate higher quality firms by issuing more debt. 
Managerial Risk Aversion 
A lot of studies exploit managerial risk aversion to obtain a signaling equilibrium in 
which capital structure is determined. The basic idea is that increases in firm 
leverage allow managers to retain a larger fraction of the equity. Debt financing can 
help them to avoid dilution of their equity holding. Although the larger equity share 
reduces managerial welfare due to risk aversion, the decrease is smaller for managers 
of higher quality projects. Thus managers of higher quality firms can signal this fact 
by having more debt in equilibrium (Harris and Raviv (1991)). 
The Literature on Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities 
A large and growing empirical literature supports the hypothesis that liquidity - the 
availability of internal funds — is an important determinant of investment. Using the 
methodology developed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and a number of 
studies demonstrate that cash flow has more explanatory power for the investment 
behavior of firms that are a priori identified as the most likely to be constrained by 
internal funds when they invest. 
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) presented evidence consistent with the view 
that information and incentive problems in the capital market have important effects 
on corporate investment. This evidence comes from the fact that investment by firms 
with a close relationship to a bank - those firms is much less sensitive to their 
liquidity than firms raising their capital through more arms-length transactions. 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) examined a set of small and high-tech firms and 
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found out a substantial effect of internal finance on R&D investment. Their results 
are consistent with the view that, because of the capital market imperfections, the 
flow of internal finance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small 
high-tech firms acquire technology through R&D. 
Taken as a whole, the papers in this literature provide substantial evidence that firms 
invest as if there is a perceived wedge between the cost of internal and external 
funds. 
The different costs between internal and external funds is generally interpreted as 
evidence that there is a premium on external funds arising from contracting and 
information problems as first modeled by Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) and 
Myers and Majluf (1984). According to this explanation, the relationship between 
liquidity and investment is typically a symptom of underinvestment; firms pass up 
some positive NPV projects because of the inflated cost of external funds. 
An alternative interpretation of the wedge between internal and external funds is not 
that external funds are too expensive, but rather that internal funds are too 
inexpensive from a manager's point of view. These agency problems are emphasized 
by Jensen (1986) in his free cash flow theory and are formally modeled by Stulz 
(1990). According to this explanation, the relationship between liquidity and 
investment is a symptom of overinvestment; managers overspend internal funds on 
unprofitable projects.^ 
6 See Hadlock Charles J., "Ownership, liquidity, and Investment," Rand Journal of 
Economics 29 (1998)，487-508. 
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Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the literature on ownership structures is presented first. The 
theoretical explanations for capital structure are summarized afterwards. The 
literature studies on investment-cash flow sensitivities are presented at the end of this 





The company accounting data used in this empirical study is mainly taken from 
DataStream and PACAP, which includes 1530 publicly traded non-financial 
institutions and unregulated utilities^ in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. It covers the period 
from 1994 to 1996. Since corporations do not easily make dramatic change on their 
ownership structure, the ownership structure data used in this empirical thesis come 
from "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations" by 
Claessens, et al. (2000). The ownership structure data sample contains 1797 firms. It 
covers the period from January 1 through December 31，1996. 
The data set is then constructed in the following steps. First, I match the company 
accounting data with the ownership structure data. Some of the firms having the 
company accounting record but without ownership structure information are deleted. 
Similarly, some firms having the ownership structure information but without 
company accounting record are also deleted. This selection criterion leaves me with 
1525 firms for leverage analysis and 910 firms for liquidity analysis. 
Secondly, for leverage analysis, some firms in the sample were eliminated, these are 
7 Following conventional studies in the filed of leverage and investment, financial 
institutions and regulated utilities are not considered in this thesis. For financial firms, the 
profitability and valuation data are difficult to calculate and to compare with firms in other 
sectors. Regulated utilities can also be strongly influenced by government regulations. 
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firms for which all the information needed to estimate their financing decisions to be 
used as the independent and dependent variables does not exist. This sample 
selection criterion then leaves me with about 1,473 corporations in nine East Asian 
economies for market leverage analysis, 1,484 corporations for book leverage 
analysis. Similarly, for liquidity constraints and investment analysis, due to data 
availability, only four countries are examined, that is, 910 firms from Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
This sample is chosen for several reasons. First, as documented by La Porta, et al. 
(1999)，ownership structures exhibit relatively little concentration in the United 
States. Elsewhere, most firms are predominantly controlled by a single large 
shareholder. Thus, studying non-U. S. firms can provide evidence about the effects of 
large shareholders that is difficult to detect in U.S. data. Moreover, non-U.S. firms 
exhibit far more divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights than U.S. 
firms do. In most countries the largest shareholder often establishes control over a 
firm despite little cash-flow rights. Using a sample of corporations outside the United 
States, we are thus better to disentangle the incentive and entrenchment effects of 
large ownership that are so difficult to tell in U.S. data. 
Secondly, previous researchers have analyzed the East Asian corporation sample in 
the 1990s and have identified that, most East Asia firms show a sharp divergence 
between cash flow rights and control rights in the hands of the largest shareholder. 
These findings have important implications for the ability and incentives of 
controlling shareholders to expropriate from minority shareholders. 
Thirdly, there are reasons to believe that the power of the tests will be maximized by 
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examining the mid 1990s, which is right before the South East Asia financial crisis. 
The test results can draw implications in corporate governance and financial policy. 
From this point of view, the impacts of ownership structures on leverage and 
investment-cash flow sensitivity of East Asian corporations are investigated. 
Ownership and Control Definition 
Studying the separation of ownership and control requires data on cash-flow rights 
and control rights, which are calculated using the complete chain of ownership. The 
definition of ownership relies on cash-flow right, meaning the right to claim 
dividends. Control right is the right of a common stock shareholder to vote, in person 
or by proxy, for members of the board of directors and other matters of corporate 
policy, such as the issuance of senior securities, stock splits and substantial changes 
in operations. It mainly relies on voting right. The separation of control rights from 
cash-flow rights is generated because of the uses of deviation from 
one-share-one-vote ,^ pyramiding schemes and cross-holdings. 
Following La Porta, et al. (1999), suppose that a family owns 10 percent of the stock 
of publicly traded firm A, which in turn has 20 percent of the stock of firm B. It can 
be said that the family controls 10 percent of firm B-the weakest link in the chain of 
control rights. In contrast, it can be said that the family owns about 2 percent of the 
cash-flow rights of firm B, the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain. 
The distinction between cash-flow rights and control rights is then made by using for 
8 One-share one-vote rule is the restriction on NYSE, AMEX , and Nasdaq companies 
forbidding them from taking any actions which would significantly dilute or restrict the voting 
rights of current shareholders. 
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each firm information on pyramid structures, cross-holdings among firms, and 
dual-class shares. 
To determine effective control at any intermediate levels as well as the ultimate level, 
a cutoff point is needed assuming that the largest shareholder has effective control 
over the intermediate and final corporations. The cutoff of 10 percent is used because 
(1) it provides a significant threshold of votes; and (2) most countries mandate 
disclosure of 10 percent ownership stakes, and usually even lower.^ 
Patterns of the East Asian Firm Ownership 
Before analyzing the financial policies, it is important to know the ownership 
structures of East Asian Firms. 
Following La Porta, et al. (1999), first, the firms that are widely held and those with 
ultimate owners should be distinguished. The commonly used definition of a widely 
held corporation that does not have any owner with 10 percent or more of control 
rights is applied. The ultimate ownership and control patterns are then analyzed. 
Following La Porta, et al. (1999), four types of ultimate owners are considered in this 
study: (1) a family or an individual, (2) the State, (3) a widely held financial 
institution such as a bank or an insurance company, (4) a widely held corporation.⑴ 
9 La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, "Corporate Ownership around the World," the 
Journal of Finance Vol. LIV (1999)，471-517. 
10 In La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), State control is a separate category 
because it is a form of concentrated ownership in which the State uses firms to pursue political 
objectivfc^s, while the public pays for the losses (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). Widely held 
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I start by reporting descriptive statistics on the separation of ultimate cash flow and 
control rights of East Asian corporations in the hands of the largest shareholders in 
Table 1. The Thai corporations display the most concentrated cash-flow rights, 
35.86% on average, followed by Indonesia companies with 29.73% and Hong Kong 
companies with 28.05%. Japan and Korea have the least concentration of ownership 
rights at 6.12% and 19.1%, respectively. A quarter of Thai companies have more 
than 44% of the cash-flow rights in the hands of the largest shareholder on average; a 
quarter of Japanese firms have only 2% cash-flow rights in the hands of the largest 
shareholder. 
The concentration of control rights in the hands of the largest shareholder is similar 
to that of cash-flow rights, with Thai and Indonesian companies having the highest 
concentration at 38.29% and 37.76%, respectively, followed by Hong Kong and 
Malaysian companies at 32.68% and 31.34%, respectively. The least concentration 
of control rights is documented in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (10.22%, 21.29%, and 
23.34%, respectively). 
Panel C shows the ratio of the cash-flow to control rights. The separation of 
ownership and control is highest in Japan and Singapore and lowest in Thailand. For 
example, the typical large controlling holder in Japan has 10 ultimate votes for each 
6 direct shares held. In Thailand, to get 10 ultimate votes, a large control holder 
corporations and widely held financial institutions are also given as separate categories as owners 
because it is unclear whether the firms they control should be thought of as widely held or as 
having an ultimate owner. A firm controlled by a widely held corporation or financial institution 
can be thought of either as widely held since the management of the controlling entity is not itself 
accountable to an ultimate owner, or as controlled by that management. For these reasons (and 
because bank ownership is of independent interest), we keep these categories separate. 
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needs nearly 9.5 shares held for each. 
Table 2 shows that the separation of ownership and control varies significantly by 
type of owner. As mentioned above, four types of controlling shareholders as defined 
in La Porta, et al. (1999) are studied. 
The results show several interesting patterns. In all countries but Japan, Korea and 
Singapore, family-controlled firms have the most separation of ownership and 
control. Firms controlled by widely held financial institutions have the most 
separation (0.5084) in Japan. State-controlled firms show the most separation in 
Korea (0.8667) and Singapore (0.6720). 
In sum, the sample shows a similar pattern which has already been disclosed in 
Claessens, et al. (2000): in all East Asian countries, control is enhanced through 
pyramid structures, and cross-holdings among firms. Voting rights consequently 
exceed formal cash-flow rights, especially in Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia. Most 
East Asian firms show a sharp divergence between cash flow rights and control 
rights, that is, the largest shareholder is often able to control a firm's operations with 
a relatively small direct stake in its cash flow rights. Generally, the divergence 
between cash-flow rights and control rights is most pronounced in family-controlled 
firms. 
These findings have important implications for the ability and incentives of 
controlling shareholders to expropriate from minority shareholders, as shown by 
Claessens, et al. (1999)，despite the fact that large controlling shareholders are 
important in strengthening corporate governance. 
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This is particularly the case that worries us when there is a large deviation of control 
rights from cash-flow rights in the corporation. Although the corporate governance is 
strengthened by concentrated ownership, the potential expropriation of minority 
shareholders by controlling shareholders might happen at the same time. ‘ ^  In this 
context, it is possible to analyze the ownership structure and to find out their effects 
on firms' leverage and investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Country Characteristic Variables 
Some country characteristic effects are also considered in our discussions, since there 
are a lot of research studies suggesting that, the extent of legal protection of investors 
in a country is an important determinant of the development of its financial markets. 
For example, La Porta, et al. (2002) found poor shareholder protection is penalized 
with lower valuations, and higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling 
shareholder improves valuation, especially in countries with poor investor protection. 
The result on incentives is consistent with the findings of Claessens, et al. (2000) on 
a larger sample of companies from East Asia. This evidence indirectly supports the 
importance of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in 
many countries, and for the role of law in limiting such expropriation. As such, it 
adds an important link to the explanation of the consequences of investor protection 
for financial market development. The evidence expands the understanding of the 
role of investor protection in shaping corporate finance by clarifying the roles, which 
11. Because ownership is highly concentrated and the divergence between cash-flow rights 
and control rights is large, while manager-owner conflicts are generally limited (Claessens, et al. 
(2002), the separation of the two may influence firms' capital structure and investment due to 
largest shareholder's incentive and entrenchment effects. 
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both the incentives and the law play in delivering values to outside shareholders. 
To examine the influence of investor protection on capital structure, some 
specifications by interacting ownership structures variables with country 
characteristic indexes are added. The following variables in Table 3 are taken from 
La Porta, et al. (1998)，which describes the country characteristic variables collected 
for 49 countries. The first column gives the name of the variable. The second column 
describes the variable and gives the range of possible values. The third column 
provides the sources from which the variable was collected. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter first presents the sample selection criteria and the reason of choosing 
this sample for analysis. Since the most important explanatory variables in this thesis 
are cash-flow rights and control rights in the hands of the largest shareholder, the 
ownership and control definition is given following La Porta, et al. (1999). A 
description of the ownership structure pattern of East Asian firms is presented using 
the sample we have constructed. Another set of country characteristic variables I use 
in this thesis is presented at the end of this chapter. The empirical analysis of the 
relationship between leverage and ownership structure is reported in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES 
AND FIRM LEVERAGE 
Rationale for the Study 
The interrelation between corporate governance and firm's financial structures has 
been documented both theoretically and empirically. In particular, ownership 
structure affects the firm's debt level because it affects agency costs in the firm. 
Firms that have high managerial shareholdings, high ownership concentration and 
large institutional investors are likely to use less debt. This is because these 
companies may have less agency problems (Wiwattanakantang (1999)). Large 
shareholders have strong incentives to maximize their firms' value and are able to 
collect information and oversee managers, and so can help overcome one of the 
principal-agent problems in the modem corporation-the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Large shareholders also 
have strong incentives to put pressure on managers or even to oust them through a 
proxy fight or a takeover. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have pointed out，"Large 
shareholders thus address the agency problem in that they have a general interest in 
profit maximization, and adequate control over the assets of the firm to have their 
interest respected". 
On the other hand, Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988) suggest that the 
entrenchment motives may cause the controlling shareholder to increase leverage 
beyond the optimal point, in order to inflate the voting power of their equity stakes 
and reduce the possibility of takeover attempts. When there is separation of control 
rights and cash-flow rights, and the equity holding in the hands of the controlling 
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shareholder is relatively small, the motive to preserve equity dominance through debt 
financing will be particularly strong. Another possibility is that entrenched 
controlling shareholders sometimes adopt excess leverage as a transitory device that 
signals a commitment to sell assets or otherwise restructure, thereby preempting 
takeover attempts by outsiders who might have different plans for increasing firm 
value (Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997)). 
Hypothesis on the Relationship between Ownership Structures and Firm 
Leverage 
Based on the literature mentioned above, this thesis want to seek evidence about the 
effects of the ownership structures on firms leverage when there is a large deviation 
of control rights from cash flow rights in the corporations. Supposing the controlling 
shareholder can have decision rights on the capital structure of the corporation, the 
following hypotheses will be tested. 
The first hypothesis holds that, the controlling shareholders may need to conduct 
investment and expand the business scope, and will thus need to raise new funds. 
They may increase debt because raising debt will not dilute the controlling position 
of their shareholding in the corporation. They can still keep the shareholding 
dominance. This is the non-dilution story. The controlling shareholders may also 
want to raise debt in capital structure because they want to show to the outside 
investors that the corporate governance is good and the company is running well so 
they do not need to worry about debt default. These stories rely critically on the 
existence of adequate bankruptcy procedure and laws in that country. Otherwise 
borrowers do not need to worry about debt default and bankruptcy. 
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In this sense, it is predicted debt increase with the degree of separation between 
control and cash flow rights (this should be salient when the cash flow rights in the 
hands of the controlling shareholder is very low). 
The second hypothesis is, if financial distress is a real concern, the controlling 
shareholder can avoid both debt and equity financing and rely more on internal 
financing. They can also transfer funds from other companies controlled by them to 
support funding needs of one company. This is the unique aspect of a large 
conglomerate or business group that the large shareholder is running. So, when there 
is a large deviation between ownership and control, the controlling shareholder may 
resist the role of debt in corporate governance because debt will constrain their 
misuse of corporate funds through the threat of debt default and financial distress. 
The controlling shareholder may want to reduce the debt level that the corporation 
will take so as to maintain their control over the firm (Once debt default occurs with 
high debt level, the control right may transfer from the controlling shareholder to the 
creditor). From the perspective of entrenchment, it is desirable to reduce the leverage 
and debt level, which suggests a negative effect between firm leverage and the 
largest shareholder's cash-flow rights. 
In discussing the role of debt, the adequacy of bankruptcy procedure is a real concern. 
If bankruptcy procedure is inadequate, creditors cannot successfully seize the 
debtors' assets/collateral once debt default occurs. Then debt as an instrument to 
strengthen corporate governance is certainly far from ideal. That is why creditor 
rights and bankruptcy adequacy index are used in shaping the leverage pattern across 
countries. 
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Of course there are also some market disciplinary factors. For example, growth 
firms/high market-book value firms may automatically constrain managerial 
opportunism. Therefore, various firm characteristics are considered. The firm 
characteristics that contribute to market-generated self-governance can also play a 
role. Growth firms have better self-governance. The story of large controlling 
shareholder reducing leverage to entrench themselves may be most salient in 
companies with stronger self-governance in countries with stronger bankruptcy 
procedure because the strong self-governance reduces the need to signal to the 
market by high leverage, and the controlling shareholders' entrenchment motive will 
dominate. On the other hand, over-borrowing may be depressed in companies with 
good self-govemance, and this kind of depression will be particularly high in 
countries with strong bankruptcy procedure. 
Description of Regression Variables 
The basic regression specification employed is as follows: 
Leverage=f (Control variables, Ownership Structure Variable)+ £ 
The description of regression variables is shown in Table 4. We start by including 
several firm-specific variables commonly used in studies of firm leverage as control 
variables. Specifically, the average value of non-debt tax shields for the year of 1994 
and 1995 is included. It is expected that firms with large non-debt tax shields relative 
to their expected cash flow will include less debt in their capital structures because 
tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax 
benefits of debt financing. 
Profitability (the proxy used is return on assets (ROA), which is the average ratio of 
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earnings before interest, taxes to total assets for the year of 1994 and 1995) and firm 
size (measured by the logarithm of its average sales volume for the year of 1994 and 
1995) are also included in the regression analysis. On the one hand, profitability is 
expected to be negatively related to firm leverage for the reason that: firms prefer 
raising capital, first from retained earnings, second from debt, and third from issuing 
new equity. This may be due to the costs of issuing new equity. These can be costs 
arising because of asymmetric information. In either case, the past profitability of a 
firm, and hence the amount of earnings available to be retained should be an 
important determinant of its current capital structure. This means that high profit 
firms should have a smaller debt ratio. On the other hand, the positive correlation 
between profitability and leverage is also supported when considering the supply side. 
Raj an and Zingales (1995) argue that creditors prefer to give loans to firms with high 
current cash flow. 
Also, size may be inversely related to the level of information asymmetries between 
insiders and outside investors (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Larger firms tend to 
release more information to public than smaller firms. If this is the case, larger firms 
may favor equity financing. However, Warner (1977) and Ang (1982) provide 
evidence, suggesting that firm size can serve as an inverse proxy for unobservable 
credit risk. These arguments suggest that large firms should be more highly 
leveraged. 
The regression model also includes tangibility (the proxy used in this study to 
measure the value of tangible assets of the firm is the fixed assets ratio), that is net 
value of property, plant and equipment divided by total assets) in the analysis. The 
positive correlation between a firm's liquidity value and the level of debt is predicted 
27 
by both the tax model and the agency model. Lenders require assets that can be used 
as collateral to compensate for the chance of the asset-substitution problem occurring. 
For firms that cannot provide collateral, lenders may require higher lending terms. 
Therefore, debt financing is more costly than equity financing. Moreover the asset 
substitution problem is less likely to occur when firms have more assets already in 
place (Myers, 1977). The higher the value of tangible assets, the more likely a firm 
will have a high leverage ratio. 
The market to book ratio is used as a measurement of market-generated corporate 
governance mechanism. For example, if firms have high market-to-book ratio 
(growth opportunities), then the controlling shareholders may self-discipline 
themselves better to dampen the effect of the separation between cash flow rights and 
control rights on leverage. Therefore, the negative impact of the separation of the two 
rights is expected will be most salient in companies with weak market-generated 
corporate governance. The strong and weak market-generated corporate governance 
firms are captured in this way: first group firms in each country into two categories: 
those with above-median market to book ratio, and those with below-median ratios, 
then interact them with the ownership structure variables and country characteristic 
variables. A dummy named grow is used to show whether the market-generated 
corporate governance is strong as an alternative. 
Industry dummy and country dummy variables are also included in all the 
regressions to correct for possible difference among industries and countries. The 
leisure sector is used as the base industry, and Singapore is used as the base country. 
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The Heteroscedasticity Problem and Solution 
There are several basic assumptions that have to be fulfilled for the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression model to generate estimators with desirable properties. It is 
well known that when the assumptions of the linear regression model are met, the 
OLS method produces best linear unbiased (BLU) estimators of the parameters, 
otherwise the estimation and prediction of the model may become biased and 
inefficient. 
One of the basic assumptions of regression analysis is constant error variance, or 
homoskedasticity. Heteroscedasticity, or unequal variances, is often encountered 
when using cross-sectional data. If the errors are heteroscedastic, the OLS estimator 
remains linear and unbiased, but becomes inefficient. More importantly, estimators 
of the standard errors are inconsistent. 
The estimated standard errors can be either too large or too small, in either case 
resulting in incorrect statistical inferences. Given that heteroscedasticity is a common 
problem in cross-sectional data analysis, and it is likely to occur in the present study. 
Testing for heteroscedasticity becomes important for prudent data analysis. 
Therefore, before certain correction step is performed, a test for heteroscedasticity is 
conducted first. The test performed in this thesis is known as the Breusch-Pagan test 
for heteroskedasticity because it is easy to apply. 
When the heteroscedasticity problem is confirmed to be present in my regression 
models, the conventional OLS standard errors, hence, the t-values of the estimated 
coefficients in the models are misleading. 
29 
There are lots of methods to correct for heteroscedasticity. However, as written in 
Long and Ervin (2000), "Standard econometrics texts, such as Judge et al. 
(1985:422-445), consider a variety of methods that can be used when the form and 
magnitude is known or can be estimated. Essentially, these methods involve 
weighting each observation by the inverse of the standard deviation of the error for 
that observation. The resulting coefficient estimates are efficient and unbiased, with 
unbiased estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients. Unfortunately, the form 
of heteroscedasticity is rarely known, which makes this solution generally 
impractical “ 
When the form of heteroscedasticity is unknown, the heteroscedasticity consistent 
covariance matrix, hereafter HCCM, provides a consistent estimator of the 
covariance matrix of the slope coefficients in the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Theoretically, the use of HCCM allows a researcher to avoid the adverse effects of 
heteroscedasticity on hypothesis testing even when nothing is known about the form 
of the heteroscedasticity. 12 This powerful result was introduced in White's (1980) 
classic paper. In that paper, the asymptotically justified form of the HCCM was 
referred to as HCO. In a later paper, MacKinnon and White (1985) presented three 
alternative estimators known as HCl, HC2, and HC3, While these estimators are 
asymptotically equivalent to HCO, they were expected to have superior properties in 
finite samples. Often we use White's (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity in 
order to produce asymptotically consistent t-statistics. Using the White's approximate 
estimator for the variance, it replaces the heteroscedastic variance, say, sigma 
squared (t), by the squares of the least squares residuals. Thus, the robust White 
variance estimator rendered regression resistant to the heteroskedasticity problem. 
12 See Long and Ervin (2000). 
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However, Long and Ervin (2000) report extensive simulation evidence confirming 
and elaborating upon what MacKinnon and White (1985) had earlier reported on the 
performance of the White (1980) estimator as well as some variants. The combined 
evidence suggests that use of White's (1980) adjustment is inferior to its variants 
(denoted as HCl, HC2 and HC3). 
Since the alternative estimators HC2 or HC3 provide more reliable standard errors 
than HCO, HC2 is used in this study to correct for heteroscedasticity problem. 
Regression Results 
As mentioned above, a test for heteroscedasticity is conducted first. If the 
heteroscedasticity problem is confirmed to be present in the regression models, the 
“HC2” estimator is then applied to render the regression resistant to the 
heteroscedasticity problem. 
The empirical results are presented in the following sequence. First, the results of the 
effect of the largest shareholder's cash-flow rights on debt-equity decisions are 
shown. The separation of ownership and control's impacts on leverage are discussed 
afterwards. The results of separation's impacts combined with country characteristic 
and firm characteristic variables are next presented. The summary statistics of 
leverage in book value and market value are depicted in Table 5 and Table 6 by 
economy and industry, respectively. 
Summary statistics of leverage ratios by economy are illustrated in Table 5. Korea 
has the highest leverage ratio (either book value or market value). Singapore has the 
lowest market leverage ratio, the Philippines has the lowest book leverage ratio. 
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Table 6 presents information on book and market leverage ratios according to their 
main industrial sector. Among different industries, Transportation has the highest 
level of book leverage ratio. Textiles and Trade has the highest level of market 
leverage ratio. Reasons for some industries having significant higher debt ratio than 
others are left for further research. 
Non-Dilution Effects on Financing Decisions from the Perspective of Cash-Flow 
Rights in the Hands of the Largest Shareholder 
By using the exact ownership share and ownership share dummy as measures of 
ownership structure, Table 7 reports the regression results of leverage ratio on these 
explanatory variables. The overall results are consistent with the hypotheses. 
Column 1 of Table 7 reports the exact ownership share's impact on leverage. The 
estimated coefficients of Ownership are negative for the dependent variable based on 
book values, and positive for the dependent variable based on market values. 
However, the estimates are consistently insignificant across all the regressions. This 
result is consistent with my hypotheses as I insist that the leverage ratio should 
exhibit a non-linear relationship with respect to Ownership, since the incentive and 
entrenchment effects vary with the variation of ownership. 
Columns 2, 3 and 4 then use the ownership share dummy to capture this property. As 
we can see from column 2，when the cash-flow rights is rising from 0 to 5%, 
leverage ratio also increases, especially significant at the 5% level when book 
leverage ratio is used as dependent variable. This may be due to the fact that, when 
the cash flow right in the hands of the largest shareholder is smaller than 5%, the 
controlling shareholder may want to keep their shareholding dominance. When they 
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need to conduct investment and expand the business scope, they will need to raise 
new funds. They may increase debt, because raising debt will not dilute the 
controlling position of their shareholding in the corporation. They can still keep the 
shareholding dominance. Or the controlling shareholders want to raise debt in capital 
structure because they want to show to the outside investors that the corporate 
governance is good and the company is running well so they do not need to worry 
about debt default. 
When the cash-flow rights is rising from 5% to 10%, the controlling shareholder 
tends to avoid debt financing, the estimated coefficient on the variable of TcashS in 
Column 3 is negative and significant at the 5% level for the dependent variable either 
based on book value or based on market value. A potential explanation for the result 
reported in Column 3 is that, when the cash-flow right in the hands of the largest 
shareholder is rising from 5% to 10%, the ownership concentration has reached to a 
point where there is no need to increase debt anymore. If financial distress is really a 
concern, the controlling shareholder can avoid both debt and equity financing. 
Instead, they can increase internal financing. The controlling shareholder may resist 
the role of debt in corporate governance, because debt will constrain their misuse of 
corporate funds through the threat of debt default and financial distress. From the 
perspective of entrenchment, they will like to reduce the leverage and debt level, 
which suggests a negative effect between firm leverage and the largest shareholder's 
cash-flow rights. 
Columi'. 4 is the specification where the ownership share dummies are put together 
and the estimated coefficient of TcashS is negative and statistically significant in 
both cases. The estimated coefficients of TcashlO and Tcash20 are negative for the 
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dependent variable based on book values, and positive for the dependent variable 
based on market values. However, the estimates are consistently insignificant across 
all the regressions. 
Columns 5，6 and 7 is a little bit different from columns 2, 3 and 4. The exact 
ownership share is included in Columns 5, 6 and 7 as a control variable to check for 
robustness, and the results are consistent with the specifications in column 2，3 and 4. 
In sum, as the incentive and entrenchment effects vary with the variation of 
ownership, when the ownership share in the hands of the largest shareholder is 
relatively small, the incentive effects dominate, and leverage tends to increase with 
respect to ownership. When the ownership share is increasing from 5% to 10%， 
entrenchment effects will become important, and leverage ratio will become lower. 
When the ownership share in the hands of the largest shareholder becomes relatively 
large, there is no consistent result with regard to the relationship between Ownership 
and leverage. 
Separation of Ownership and Control' Impact on Leverage 
Table presents regression results that link leverage ratios to the degree of 
separation of ownership and control in the hands of the largest shareholder. The 
degree of separation of cash-flow rights and control rights is measured by three 
different variables separately. 
Column 1 of Table 8 uses the simple difference between Control rights and 
Cash-flow rights as the main independent variable. The larger the difference, the 
larger the degree of separation. According to my first hypothesis, debt increases with 
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the separation between ownership and control, which suggest a positive correlation 
between firms leverage and separation of ownership from control. The regression 
result shows that, the sign of the coefficient estimated for "Control minus ownership" 
is positive as was expected, and consistently significant with respect to measures of 
leverage ratio. 
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Columns 2 and 3 report the coefficients for book and market leverage using other 
two different variables: "Control exceeds ownership" is a dummy variable equals 1 if 
"Control minus ownership" is larger than zero; otherwise, it is zero. "Ratio" is a 
continuous variable, which is defined as the share of cash-flow rights divided by the 
share of control rights in the hands of the largest shareholder. The smaller the ratio, 
the larger the degree of separation. Again, the positive coefficients on "Control 
minus ownership" and the negative coefficients on "Ratio" provide support for my 
first hypothesis: the controlling shareholders want to raise debt in capital structure 
because they want to show to the outside investors that the corporate governance is 
good and the company is running well so they do not need to worry about debt 
default. Or the controlling shareholder may need to conduct investment and expand 
the business scope, and they will thus need to raise new funds. They may increase 
debt, because raising debt will not dilute the controlling position of their 
shareholding in the corporation. They can still keep the shareholding dominance. In 
this sense, debt increases with the degree of separation between cash flow rights and 
control rights. 
To check the basic robustness of the results in Table 8，I include the exact ownership 
share and ownership share dummy as control variables in Table 9. However, the 
basic findings concerning the relationship between the leverage and the separation of 
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ownership from control remain unchanged. 
So the results reported in Table 9 provide support for my first hypothesis, which 
insists that, the controlling shareholders may need to conduct investment and expand 
the business scope, and will thus need to raise new funds. They may increase debt, 
because raising debt will not dilute the controlling position of their shareholding in 
the corporation. They can still keep the shareholding dominance. So, when there is a 
large deviation of control from ownership, we predict debt to increase with the 
degree of separation between control and cash flow rights (this should be salient 
when the cash flow rights in the hands of the controlling shareholder is very low). 
Among the other explanatory variables, profitability and tangibility have significant 
explanatory power, with profitability showing a negative coefficient and tangibility a 
positive coefficient. The first finding is common, which supports the pecking order 
theory. High profit firms use internal financing, low profit firms use more debt 
because their internal funds are not adequate. The second suggests that for this 
sample, the higher the value of tangible assets, the more likely that a firm will have a 
high leverage ratio. The positive correlation between a firm's liquidity value and the 
level of debt is predicted by both the tax model and the agency model. 
The estimated coefficient of firm size is positive, but the estimate is not robust with 
respect to measures of leverage ratios. However, the result implies that firm size 
serves as an inverse proxy for unobservable credit risk, which suggests that large 
firms should be more highly leveraged. 
The estimated coefficient of Non-debt tax shield is consistently significant and has 
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the predicted sign across equations. Market to book ratio is statistically insignificant 
for all specifications. 
Accounting for Country Effects and Firm Characteristics 
As noted above, when the controlling shareholder can have decision rights on the 
capital structure of the corporation, one possible result is that the controlling 
shareholder wants to raise debt in capital structure because raising debt will not 
dilute their controlling positions in the firm. Also, another motivation for this kind of 
action may be attributed to the fact that, they want to show to the outside investors 
that the corporate governance is good and the company is running well so they do not 
need to worry about debt default. This is the signaling manipulation story. These 
stories rely critically on the existence of adequate bankruptcy procedure and laws in 
that country. Otherwise borrowers do not need to worry about debt default and 
bankruptcy. From this point of view, a set of country characteristic indexes is added 
in the regression to capture the potential effects. Then, the over-borrowing problems 
will be most salient in countries with weaker bankruptcy procedure because 
borrowers do not need to worry about debt default and bankruptcy. And the story of 
large controlling shareholder reducing leverage to entrench themselves may be most 
salient in countries with stronger bankruptcy procedure, where financial distress is 
really a concern, and the controlling shareholders' entrenchment motive will 
dominate. 
To check my hypotheses, the following steps are then taken. First "Control minus 
ownership" and "Control exceeds ownership" are still used as different measures of 
Separation of ownership from control, then the two variables are interacted with 
three different measures of country effect indexes, this combination results in six 
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different specifications in Table 10. 
The country characteristics are measured by Cr, Acr and CrLaw, respectively. Cr is 
an index aggregating different creditor rights. Acr is a dummy equals one if the 
creditor rights is above median, otherwise, it is zero. CrLaw is a proxy of enforceable 
creditor rights. 
The estimated coefficients for ownership structures variables and country 
characteristic-interacted terms in Table 10 are consistent in direction as predicted. 
Their estimates are statistically significant and robust with respect to different 
measures of country characteristic index and measures of leverage ratio. 
The estimated coefficients of the two proxies for the degree of separation: "Control 
minus ownership" and "Control exceeds ownership" have the predicted signs: 
leverage is positively related with the degree of separation of ownership from control. 
For the interacted terms, constructed by interacting the country characteristic index 
with ownership structure variables, the coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant. So, the hypotheses which also consider the country effect are proved to 
be right. The controlling holders raise debt to avoid dilution of the controlling 
position of their shareholding in the corporation. Debt can also be used as an 
instrument of corporate governance when separation and agency cost is high. This is 
the signaling manipulation story. When the country has strong bankruptcy procedure, 
the strong self-govemance reduces the need to signal to the market by high leverage, 
and the controlling shareholders' entrenchment motive will dominate. 
To further check the robustness of the results, in results which are not reported here I 
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employ the following modifications to the baseline regressions in Table 10. First the 
exact ownership share as a control variable is included. Secondly an alternative 
measure of ownership share-the ownership share dummy as control variables is used. 
With these modifications, the basic findings concerning the relationship between the 
leverage and the separation of ownership from control remain unchanged. However, 
the estimated coefficients on interacted terms have the predicted sign, but not 
consistently significant across different measures of country effect variables. 
As noted above, the firm characteristics which contribute to market-generated 
self-govemance can also play a role. Then the story of large controlling shareholder 
reducing leverage to entrench themselves may be most salient in companies with 
stronger self-govemance in countries with stronger bankruptcy procedure because 
the strong self-govemance reduces the need to signal to the market by high leverage 
and the controlling shareholders' entrenchment motive will dominate. 
Considering the country effects and firm characteristics mentioned above, some 
specifications by interacting ownership structures variables with country 
characteristic indexes and firm characteristic variables are added in the analysis. The 
results are reported in Table 11. 
There are six specifications in Table 11. The country characteristics are stilled 
measured by Cr, Acr and CrLaw, respectively. Grow is a dummy variable equals one 
when the market to book ratio is above median, otherwise, it is zero. 
The estimated coefficients for ownership structures variables and country 
characteristic-interacted terms are consistent in direction as predicted, but their 
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estimates are not robust with respect to measures of leverage ratio. 
When the market leverage ratio is used as the dependent variable, the results are 
statistically significant and robust with respect to different measures of country 
characteristic index. The estimated coefficients of the two proxies for the degree of 
separation: Contminuscash and Contexcash have the predicted signs: leverage is 
positively related with the degree of separation of cash-flow rights and control rights; 
for the interacted terms, which are constructed by interacting the country 
characteristic index with ownership structure variables and firm characteristic 
variables, the coefficients are negative and statistically significant. The coefficient of 
the interacted terms in column 1 to 4 are negative and significant at the 1% level, the 
coefficients of the interacted terms in the last two columns are negative and 
significant at the 10% and 5%, respectively. When I use the book leverage as 
explanatory variable, I get the predicted signs for our ownership structures variables 
and interacted terms, but the estimated coefficients are not consistently significant 
with respect to different measures of ownership structure variables. 
However, the results reported in Table 11 provide evidence for my hypotheses: 
When self-govemance is strong and the country also has strong bankruptcy 
procedure, the strong self-govemance reduces the need to signal to the market by 
high leverage, and the controlling shareholders' entrenchment motive will dominate. 
Among the other explanatory variables, the results are the same as those when 
country and firm characteristic variables are excluded. 
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Chapter Summary 
Chapter 4 mainly examines the relationship between firms leverage and ownership 
structure. 
Using data from nine East Asian Economies, namely, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, this thesis 
want to seek evidence about ownership structures' impact on firm leverage when 
there is a large deviation of control rights from cash-flow rights in the corporations. 
Two hypotheses are mainly considered in the empirical analysis. One is the 
non-dilution story, which predicts debt to increase with the degree of separation 
between control and cash-flow rights. The other one is the financial distress story, 
which suggests a negative effect between firm leverage and the degree of separation 
between control and cash-flow rights. 
Through regression analysis, we find firms with higher separation of cash-flow rights 
to control rights (in the hands of the largest shareholder) tend to have higher leverage 
ratio. Moreover, when the influence of variation of investor protection among 
different countries is considered in the regression model, the leverage ratio tends to 
be lower in countries with better protection of creditor rights and enforcement of law. 
Next chapter will discuss the relationship between ownership structures and 




THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES 
AND INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY 
Theoretical Framework 
There are two explanations of the relationship between liquidity and investment in 
the literature: the Free-Cash-Flow problems and the Asymmetric-Information 
problems. 
Free Cash Flow Problems 
Jensen (1986) argues that when managers have more cash than is needed to fund all 
of the firm's profitable investment projects, there is an incentive for managers to 
invest the excess cash in unprofitable projects. This overinvestment problem derives 
from the fact that the managers are not the owners of the firm and thus may reap 
personal benefits from overinvestment without fully internalizing the costs of the 
investment decisions borne by the outside shareholders. 
According to the theory, if managers do not have free cash flow, they will not invest 
as much because accessing the external capital markets provides some discipline on 
managerial behavior plus they are risk averse. 
If firms have free cash flow, this free cash flow theory suggests that, the firm's 
managers will follow an investment rule of spending a large fraction of the firm's 
internally generated funds. This investment behavior will naturally generate a 
positive correlation between investment and cash flow. 
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As written in Hadlock (1998), “If let a denote the degree to which a firm 's managers 
internalize the returns to outside shareholders when making investment decisions. 
The free-cash-flow problem arises because a is too low and, consequently, managers 
overinvest. Thus, according to the theory outlined above, it is expected firms with 
low-a managers to exhibit a substantial sensitivity of investment to cash flow" 
Asymmetric-Information Problems 
The under investment problem in the presence of asymmetric-information was first 
demonstrated by Myers and Majluf (1984). An important assumption in their 
analysis is that managers act in the interests of existing shareholders when making 
investment and financing decisions. Again, following Hadlock (1998), if we let a 
denote the degree to which a firm's managers internalize the returns to outside 
shareholders when making a financing choice, Myers and Majluf (1984) essentially 
assume that a is typically quite high. The larger value of a, the worse the 
underinvestment problem, which should imply that investment-cash flow sensitivities 
are increasing in a. 
These two explanations of the relationship between liquidity and investment have 
very different implications for the understanding of corporate financial policy in 
investment. It is therefore important to determine their relative empirical importance. 
However, in many of the previous tests for the presence of financing constraints, 
these two competing explanations are observationally equivalent. 
Following Hadlock (1998), this thesis attempts to empirically distinguish these two 
competing explanations of why liquidity affects investment. In Hadlock (1998)，the 
tests are mainly based on examining how managerial ownership affects the 
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sensitivity of investment to cash flow. My tests examine how the largest 
shareholder's ownership stakes and the separation of ownership and control affect 
the sensitivity of investment-cash flow. The tests are based on the following 
theoretical arguments. 
Hypothesis on the Relationship between Ownership Structure and 
Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
Hypothesis One: Free Cash Flow Story (As in Hadlock (1998)) 
Large shareholding, to some extent, can create incentive enhancing effect, while the 
separation between ownership and control may create disincentive effect. If 
corporate insiders tend to misuse the corporate liquidity for their personal benefits or 
benefits of other related companies controlled by the insider, then a higher fixed 
investment sensitivity to cash flow for companies with a higher separation between 
ownership and control can be observed. 
Hypothesis Two: Asymmetric Information Story (As in Hadlock (1998)) 
When separation between ownership and control is lower, the controlling insider 
tends to internalize the returns to existing shareholders (they are more likely to work 
in the interest of shareholders) when making a financing choice. Then, 
investment-cash flow sensitivity will be higher when there is a lower separation 
between ownership and control. Here perhaps we would predict that if separation is 
low and shareholding is increasing from null to some level, then this effect is most 
salient. If separation is low，but shareholding proportion is already large, then 
entrenchment effect would come in. We can have the same prediction as in 
hypothesis 1. 
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Hypothesis Three: Tunneling Story 
This thesis often says that with separation of ownership and control, the controlling 
insider may have incentive to transfer company's financial resources to related firms 
through self-dealing. If this is the case, it is similar to the free cash flow story so that 
the fixed investment-cash flow sensitivity will rise with the degree of separation of 
ownership from control. 
Hypothesis Four: Cost of External Financing 
If minority shareholders are fearful of being expropriated in a corporation with a high 
degree of separation between ownership and control, they will be reluctant to 
contribute equity investment. Then it is more costly to raise external finance. And if 
controlling insider is fearful of losing control in debt default, they will depress 
external debt financing. There will be more reliance on internal finance, which 
contributes to a high sensitivity of investment to cash flow. If they can use debt 
financing as a signal to attract external finance, then it could be the reverse case. 
In sum, there are two predictions according to the hypotheses. The first prediction is 
mainly based on the free cash flow theory, which predicts a higher fixed investment 
sensitivity to cash flow for companies with a higher separation between ownership 
and control. The second prediction is based on the asymmetric information theory. 
When separation between ownership and control is lower, the controlling insider 
tends to internalize the returns to existing shareholders (they are more likely to work 
in the interest of shareholders) when making a financing choice. Then, 
investment-cash flow sensitivity will be higher when there is a lower separation 
between ownership and control. 
45 
Regression Specification 
Due to the limited data availability, only four countries are examined in this thesis, 
that is, 910 firms from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Firms from other 
five economies were not examined here. These are firms in which all the information 
needed to estimate their investment decisions do not exist. For example, the items 
which are needed to calculate for investment and cash flow for the other five 
economies are not available in DataStream and PACAP. 
The empirical tests can now be specified. For firms with free-cash-flow problems, a 
higher fixed investment sensitivity to cash flow for companies with a higher 
separation of ownership and control can be observed. If asymmetric-information 
problems are the main problems firms face, investment-cash flow sensitivities should 
be higher when there is a lower separation between ownership and control. 
To investigate the role of ownership on investment-cash flow sensitivities, I follow 
the same approach as Hadlock (1998), using regression terms that interact cash flow 
with ownership structure variables. 
The basic regression specification employed in this thesis is similar to Hadlock 
(1998): 
INVESTMENT = ^ ^^Control Variable^ 3 i( ^ ^ ^ )+ 员 ^ ^ ^ )* 
K K K 
Ownership Structure Variable+ ^ 
Where K is capital stock. If firms typically face free cash flow problems, when 
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ownership structure variable is the exact ownership stake in the hands of the largest 
shareholder,员 2 should not be positively significant. If we replace the exact 
ownership stake with the variable- ratio of cash flow to control rights，3 2 should be 
negative. Similarly, when using the simple difference between control rights and 
cash flow rights-Control minus ownership-as a measurement of the degree of 
separation, a positive and significant relation in the context of free cash flow theory 
should be expected. For firms with asymmetric information problems, 
investment-cash flow sensitivities should exhibit the opposite properties with respect 
to ownership structure. Finally, in a perfect capital markets world there should be no 
systematic relationship between ownership structure and investment-cash flow 
sensitivities. 
Summary Statistics 
The ownership structure variables have the same definitions as in leverage analysis. 
Table 12 presents some summary statistics for the entire sample. As reported in 
Table 12, the median level of the largest shareholder's cash flow rights is 5% and the 
mean is 11.28%, while median and mean of the control rights in the hands of the 
largest shareholder are 10% and 14.86% respectively. Separation is high on average 
according to the mean of ratio (0.6698) among the four countries: Japan, Korea, 
Thailand, and Taiwan. The control variables used here are firm size (as measured by 
the average book value of the assets for the year of 1994 and 1995), market to book 
ratio, and sales. Based on Hadlock (1998) model, several of the control variables are 
normalized by K, the average capital stock for the year of 1994 and 1995. 
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Empirical Findings 
The empirical findings are reported in Table 13. Column 1 includes the term 
interacting cash flow with Ownership, the cash-flow rights in the hands of the largest 
shareholder. The estimated coefficient on cash flow of 0.0124 is small but significant 
at the 5% level. The coefficient on cash flow interacted with Cashl of-0.0009, which 
is significant at the 1% level, implying the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
decreases slowly with the largest shareholder's ownership stake. This is consistent 
with the free cash flow story, which believes overinvestment is caused by managers 
overspending internal funds on unprofitable projects. With the largest shareholder's 
cash flow rights increasing, agency cost should decrease due to large shareholder's 
incentive enhancing effect. 
In column 2 of Table 13，cash flow is interacted with the ratio of cash flow rights to 
control rights. Since Ratio measures the degree of separation indirectly, that is, the 
smaller the ratio, the larger the degree of separation between ownership and control. 
The coefficient on Ratio interacted with cash flow is negative and significant at the 
10% level, which provides support for our first prediction based on the free cash flow 
theory: large shareholding to some extent can have incentive enhancing effect, while 
the separation between ownership and control may create disincentive effect. If 
corporate insiders tend to misuse the corporate liquidity for their personal benefits or 
benefits of other related companies controlled by the insider, a higher fixed 
investment sensitivity to cash flow for companies with a higher separation between 
ownership and control can be observed. 
In columns 3 and 4, cash flow is interacted with "Control minus ownership" and 
"Control exceeds ownership" respectively. The two variables measure the degree of 
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separation directly. The larger the value of the two variables, the larger the degree of 
separation is. Consistent with the results in columns 1 and 2, the coefficient on the 
"Control minus ownership" interacted with cash flow is positive and significant at 
the 10% level for these firms. Additionally, the coefficient for "Control exceeds 
ownership" interacted with cash flow is also positive and significant at the 10% 
level. 
One problem to point out here is that, the 4 equations in Table 13 all have very low 
goodness of fit statistics, with R-squared values less than 6%, suggesting the 
explanatory power of the independent variables was not satisfactory, the large (in 
magnitude) and significant intercept term in all four equations may indicate that 
some relevant variables have been missing from these equations. One way to solve 
this problem is to re-estimate those equations by introducing other explanatory 
variables. However, it is unclear what kinds of additional theoretically justifiable 
explanatory variables we should introduce at this stage because we have used almost 
all the control variables employed in the earlier literature. 
Also, the existence of outliers in the observations of one explanatory variable of 
Sales/K may cause problem: they may obscure the relationship between the variables 
we are interested in. We tried different methods to solve this problem. For example, 
we used the Hadi method of dealing with outliers that is available in the STATA. 
Except that the sample size got smaller, we didn't see any improvement. Another 
way we tackled the potential outlier issue is to delete those observations of Sales/K if 
their values are more than three standard deviations from the mean. That is, if the 
observed value of Sales/K is > 3*st.d of Sales/K, it will be dropped out of the 
regression analysis. However, only one observation was dropped out of the original 
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sample and the results remained the same as the original one. We hope to solve this 
problem in future research by improving our data source and coming up with more 
explanatory variables. 
If the disincentive effect is important, the negative coefficients on the ratio of 
cash-flow rights to control rights, the positive coefficients on "Control minus 
ownership" and "Control exceeds ownership" are consistent with the presence of 
free-cash-flow based market imperfections and are inconsistent with the presence of 
asymmetric-information problems. 
In sum, these estimates seem to support the free-cash-flow theories according to the 
tests outlined above. While the separation between ownership and control may create 
disincentive effect. If corporate insiders tend to misuse the corporate liquidity for 
their personal benefits or benefits of other related companies controlled by the 
insider, then a higher fixed investment sensitivity to cash flow for companies with a 
higher separation between ownership and control can be observed. 
Country Characteristic Control 
The agency cost of the separation in ownership structure can differ from country to 
country. One potential hypothesis is that in countries with strong legal institutions, 
the legal protection of investors can be good on average so that the agency cost of the 
separation will be smaller, and the reverse case holds for countries with weak rule of 
law. Then it is expected to see that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is 
particularly high in countries with weaker legal institutions and higher separation in 
ownership structure. The story can go the other route. In countries with strong legal 
institutions, it is easier to raise funds from external capital markets. Then the reliance 
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on internal capital market is smaller. Even with higher separation in ownership 
structure, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow will diminish. 
For results that are not reported in the tables, some regressions similar to Table 13 in 
leverage analysis by interacting the ownership structure variables with country 
characteristic indexes are estimated. The estimates for ownership structure variables 
and interacted terms all have the predicted sign, but insignificant. 
Chapter Summary 
Using data from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, this chapter tries to evaluate 
the influence of separation between ownership and control on investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Based on the hypothesis mentioned above, a set of regressions are 
performed. The empirical result provides support for the free cash flow theory: a 
larger separation between cash flow rights and control rights, hence, a larger agency 
cost of ownership structure is associated with a higher sensitivity of investment to 




This empirical thesis studies the relationships between ownership and control stakes 
held by the largest shareholder on the one hand, and firm leverage and the sensitivity 
of a firm's investment to its cash flow on the other hand, for a sample of publicly 
traded corporations in East Asia. The main contribution of this thesis is disentangling 
the incentive and disincentive effects of the large ownership that are so difficult to 
detect in U.S. data. 
First, test is performed on ownership structure's impact on leverage using a sample 
of 1484(for book leverage) and 1473 (for market leverage) firms from nine East 
Asian countries. Evidence is found that, firms with higher separation of cash flow 
rights to control rights (in the hands of the largest shareholder) tend to have higher 
leverage ratio. Since most East Asian Firms show a sharp divergence between 
ownership and control, and the sample period examined in this thesis is right before 
the South-East Asian Financial Crisis, This result suggests that the separation of 
ownership from control is easy to lead to a more risky capital structure, which may 
deepen the financial distress after the financial crisis in East Asian Corporations. 
This result provides support for the predictions of theoretical studies that separating 
control rights and cash-flow rights can create agency cost and this kind of ownership 
structure may lead to weak corporate governance, and may be a reason of financial 
distress after the East Asian Financial Crisis. 
Moreover, the leverage ratio is lower in countries with better protection of creditor 
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rights and enforcement of law, which suggests, debt's role as a tool to strengthen 
corporate governance decreases when self-governance is strong, and lower leverage 
ratio also helps the firm to avoid financial distress. Because concentrated corporate 
ownership is predominant in most countries outside the United States, these findings 
may have relevance worldwide. 
This thesis also documents a positive relationship between the separation of cash 
flow rights to control rights and the sensitivity of a firm's investment to its cash flow 
among corporations in Japan, Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan. The result suggests that 
the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders by large and controlling 
shareholders is an important principal-agent problem in most countries. 
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Table 12 
Separation of Cash Flow and Voting Rights in East Asian Corporations 
^ Number of ,, … „ ,, 1st 3rd 
Country ^ . Mean Std. Dev. Median _ n _ 
^ Corporations Quart lie Quart ile 
A. Cash-flow rights 
Hong Kong 157 28.05 12.11 26 19 36 
Japan 652 6.12 7.37 4 2 7 
Korea 193 19.10 9.83 18 12 24 
Indonesia 132 29.73 13.17 28 18.50 41.50 
Malaysia 171 26.25 11.64 24 16 33 
Philippines 77 24.25 11.95 23 14 33 
Taiwan 129 19. 19 9.48 19 12 24 
Thailand 110 35.86 13.01 34 26 44 
Singapore 176 23.43 11.87 22 14 32 
East Asia 1797 18.31 H.34 16 5 27 
B. Voting Rights 
Hong Kong sTbS ~ 32 24 Tl 
Japan 652 10.22 7.34 10 5 12 
Korea 193 21.29 10.49 22 12 28 
Indonesia 132 37.76 11.59 41 31 46.50 
Malaysia 171 31.34 10.78 32 24 36 
Philippines 77 27.34 11.25 25 21 34 
Taiwan 129 23.34 9.25 23 15 30 
Thailand 110 38.29 12.71 36.15 30 51 
Singapore 176 30.99 10.73 31 22 41 
East Asia 1797 22.83 H . 43 22 10 32 
C. Ratio of cash-flow to voting rights 
Hong Kong 157 0.8702 0.2268 1.0000 0.7381 1.0000 
Japan 652 0.5644 0.3648 0.4045 0.2000 1.0000 
Korea 193 0.9113 0.1906 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Indonesia 132 0.7962 0.2374 0.8318 0.6319 1.0000 
Malaysia 171 0.8436 0.2196 1.0000 0.6875 1.0000 
Philippines 77 0.8881 0.2141 1.0000 0.8519 1.0000 
Taiwan 129 0.8174 0.2233 1.0000 0.6333 1.0000 
Thailand 110 0.9447 0. 1641 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Singapore 176 0.7416 0.2256 0.7442 0.5714 1.0000 
East Asia 0. 7467 0.3124 1.0000 0.5000 1.0000 
Note.. The sample includes 1797 corporations (excluding financial institutions, SIC 




The Separation of Cash-Flow Rights and Voting Rights across Type of the Largest 
Shareholder 
Widel -Held""“Widely-Held 
Country Variables 广i e ^ e Financial Family State 
Company . 广 … . 
Institution 
Hong Kong cash-flow rights 34.0769 28.1429 26.9504 20.0000 
voting rights 34.6539 29.8571 32.7273 20.0000 
ratio 0.9734 0.9447 0.8405 1.0000 
Japan cash-flow rights 25.6111 4.4200 16.58182 27.3333 
voting rights 26.7222 9. 1564 17.4364 27.3333 
ratio 0.9473 0.5084 0.9456 1.0000 
Korea cash-flow rights 20.5238 10.0000 20.0980 8.5000 
voting rights 21.2381 10.4615 22.6928 9. 1667 
ratio 0.9678 0.9077 0.9056 0.8667 
Indonesia cash-flow rights 40.4286 25.0000 26.2784 38.6154 
voting rights 42.2381 25.0000 36.6083 40.0769 
ratio 0.9516 1.0000 0.7373 0.9687 
Malaysia cash-flow rights 34.1250 18.1667 25.5194 27.1000 
voting rights 37.1875 18.1667 31.4884 29.6500 
ratio 0.9029 1.0000 0.8131 0.9460 
Philippines cash-flow rights 26.3125 19.2500 22.8462 28.5000 
voting rights 26.8750 19.2500 28.4872 28.5000 
ratio 0.9797 1.0000 0.7957 1.0000 
Taiwan cash-flow rights 19.9688 19.2667 18.6375 28.0000 
voting rights 22.0313 20.7333 24.2375 28.0000 
ratio s 0.8892 0.8882 0.7709 1.0000 
Thailand cash-flow rights 37.7333 26.5000 35.7888 40.6333 
voting rights 37.7333 26.5000 39.0425 41.6333 
ratio 1.0000 1.0000 0.9256 0.9773 
Singapore cash-flow rights 34.5909 30.0000 23.5773 18.3846 
voting rights 37.5455 32.0000 31.8247 27.1923 
ratio 0.9154 0. 9231 0.7321 0. 6720 
Note: The reported numbers represent the mean value of cash-flow rights, voting 




Country Characteristic Variables Description 
Variable Name Description Sources 
An index aggregating the shareholder rights 
which we labeled as "anti-director 
rights" • The index is formed by adding 1 
when: (1) the country allows shareholders to 
mail their proxy vote to the firm; (2) 
shareholders are not required to deposit 
their shares prior to the General 
Shareholders' Meeting: (3) cumulative 
voting or proportional representation of Company Law 
Anti-director rights minorities in the board of directors is or Commercial 
allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities Code 
mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an Extraordinary 
Shareholders' Meeting is less than or equal 
to 10 percent (the sample median) ; or (6) 
shareholders have preemptive rights that can 
only be waved by a shareholders' vote. The 
index ranges from 0 to 6. 
An index aggregating different creditor 
rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when; 
(1) the country imposes restrictions, such as 
creditors' consent or minimum dividends to 
file for reorganization; (2) secured 
creditors are able to gain possession of Bankruptcy 
their security once the reorganization ^^^ 
Creditor Rights petition has been approved (no automatic Reorganization 
stay) ； (3) secured creditors are ranked first ^^鹏 
in the distribution of the proceeds that 
result from the disposition of the assets of 
a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not 
retain the administration of its property 
pending the resolution of the 
reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4. 
Assessment of the law and order tradition in 
the country produced by the country-risk 
rating agency International Country Risk 
(ICR). Average of the months of April and 
,, . , , 」 international 
Rule of Law October of the monthly index between 1982 and Country Risk 
1995. Scale from 0 to 10’ with lower scores 
for less tradition for law and order. (We 
changed the scale from its original range 
going from 0 to 6). 
Sources: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny(1998), 1113-1155. 
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Table 12 
Descriptions of Regression Variables 
Variables Description 
Following the approach of Wiwattanakantang (1999): Book leverage is 
defined as the book value of total debt divided by the book value of 
. total debt plus the book value of total equity. Market leverage is defined 
Dependent Variable: ^^ ^ e book value of total debt divided by the book value of total 
average liabilities plus the market value of total equity. The market value of 
total equity is defined as the number of outstanding shares multiplied by 
the share price of the last trading day of 1996. 
Explanatory variables 
n , … . , The ownership share held by the largest shareholder to declare for 
Cash-flow r i g h t s dividends 
Con t ro l r i g h t s The share of voting rights held by the largest shareholder. 
A continuous variable measuring the simple difference between the 
Lon t ro i minus share of control rights and the share of cash-flow rights in the hands of 
OwneiTship the largest shareholder. 
Con t ro l exceed A dummy equals one if control rights are higher than cash-flow rights; 
Ownership otherwise, it is zero. 
dummy variable: (1) tcashO is a dummy variable equals one if cash-flow 
rights is smaller than 5%, otherwise, it is zero; (2)tcash5 is a dummy 
variable equals one if cash-flow rights is larger than 5% and smaller 
than 10%, otherwise, it is zero;(3)tcashl0 is a dummy variable equals 
Tcash one if cash-flow rights is larger than 10% and smaller than 15%, 
otherwise, it is zero; (4)tcashl5 is a dummy variable equals one if 
cash-flow rights is larger than 15% and smaller than 20%, otherwise, it 
is zero;(5)tcash20 is a dummy variable equals one if cash-flow rights is 
larger than 20%, otherwise, it is zero. 
. A continuous variable which is defined as the share of cash-flow rights 
R a t i o divided by the share of control rights in the hands of the largest 
shareholder. 
dummy variable: (1) tratio6 is a dummy variable equals one if ratio is 
larger than 0.6, otherwise, it is zero; (2) tratioV is a dummy variable 
equals one if ratio is larger than 0.7，otherwise, it is zero; (3) tratioS is a 
T r a t i o dummy variable equals one if ratio is larger than 0.8，otherwise, it is 
r a 10 zero; (4) tratio9 is a dummy variable equals one if ratio is larger than 
0.9, otherwise, it is zero. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Gr。w A dummy variable equals to one if the market-to-book ratio is larger 
than the median, otherwise, it is zero. 
DeAngelo and Masulis present a model of optimal capital structure that 
incorporate the impact of corporate taxes, personal taxes, and 
non-debt-related corporate tax shields. They argue that tax deductions 
Non-debt tax for depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax 
sh ie lds (NDT) benefits of debt financing. As a result, firms with large non-debt debt 
tax shields relative to their expected cash flow include less debt in their 
capital structures. Indicator of non-debt tax shield used in this study is 
depreciation over total assets (D/TA). 
The proxy used in this study to measure the value of tangible assets of 
Tang i b i l i t y the firm is the fixed assets ratio (FIXED-AS SET) that is net value of 
property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. 
Prof i t a b i l i t y The proxy used is return on assets (ROA), which is the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes to total assets. 
Firm Size The measure of a firm's size used in this study is the logarithm of its 
sales volume. 
There are total eleven industries in this sample, they are petroleum(SIC 
13,29), consumer durables(SIC 25,30,36,37,50,55,57), basic industry 
(SIC 10,12,14,24,26,28,33),food and tobacco (SIC 1,2,9,20,21,54), 
construction (SIC 15，16，17,32,52)，capital goods (SIC 34,35,38)， 
industry transportation (SIC 40,41,42,44,45,47), unregulated utilities (SIC 
46,48)，textiles and trade (SIC 22,23,31,51,53,56,59), services (SIC 
72,73,75,76,80,82,87,89), and leisure (SIC 27，58,70，78,79).This results 
in eight industry dummies, where the leisure sector is used as the base 
industry. 
Nine countries are examined in the leverage part: Hong Kong, Japan, 
Country Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Singapore. This results in 8 country dummies, where Singapore is used 
as the base country. 
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Table 12 
Summary Statistics of Leverage in Nine East Asian Economies 
(Average value for the year of 1994 and 1995) 
Country Variable ” Number of Mean Standard. Min Max 
Corporations ^ . 
Deviation 
Hong Kong Leverage (book value) 155 0.3089 0.1804 0 0.7978 
Leverage (market value) 154 0.0200 0.0440 0 0.3829 
Japan Leverage(book value) 638 0.4706 0.2581 0 1.2757 
Leverage (market value) 635 0.5925 0.2569 0 0.9998 
Korea Leverage (book value) 183 0.5570 0.3006 -2.5156 0.9989 
Leverage (market value) 183 0.9608 0. 1061 0.1558 0.1000 
Indonesia Leverage(book value) 105 0.3884 0.1995 0 0.8363 
Leverage (market value) 105 0.7449 0.2770 0 0.9966 
Malaysia Leverage (book value) 130 0.2783 0.2379 0 0.9675 
Leverage (market value) 129 0.0081 0.0207 0 0.1828 
Philippines Leverage (book value) 47 0.2873 0.2379 0 0.9675 
Leverage (market value) 46 0.0731 0. 1541 0 0.5878 
Taiwan Leverage(book value) 90 0.2775 0.1476 0 0.6379 
Leverage (market value) 89 0.0824 0.1101 0 0.7254 
Thailand Leverage (book value) 73 0.4453 0.2201 0 0.9082 
Leverage (market value) 68 0.4145 0.3178 0 0.9968 
Singapore Leverage(book value) 104 0.2595 0.1777 0 0.6527 
Leverage (market value) 102 0.0055 0.0119 0 0.0979 
East Asia Leverage (book value) 1525 0.4098 0.2577 -2.5156 1.2758 
Leverage (market value) 1511 0. 4460 0. 3846 0 0.1000 
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Table 12 
Summary Statistics of Leverage and ownership structure by Industry 
(Average value for the year of 1994 and 1995) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Min Max 
Petroleum Leverage(book value) 30 0.3160 0.2363 0 0.7985 
Leverage(market value) 30 0.3855 0.4219 0 0.9945 
^nsj^i^ier Leverage (book value) 324 0.4119 0.2461 0 1.0282 
durables 
Leverage(market value) 323 0.4579 0.3706 0 1.0000 
Basic industry Leverage(book value) 254 0.4316 0.2438 0 1.0117 
Leverage(market value) 253 0.4599 0.3723 0 0.9998 
= 0 = and Leverage (book value) 139 0.3680 0.2544 0 0.9989 
Tobacco 
Leverage(market value) 138 0.3872 0.3767 0 0.9998 
Construction Leverage(book value) 170 0.4240 0.3346 -2.5156 0.9039 
Leverage(market value) 169 0.4561 0.4104 0 1.0000 
Capital Goods Leverage(book value) 201 0.4204 0.2443 0 1.2758 
Leverage(market value) 199 0.4982 0.3490 0 1.0000 
Transportation Leverage(book value) 78 0.4765 0.2986 0 0.9665 
Leverage(market value) 74 0.4360 0.3754 0 0.9998 
Unregulated Leverage(book value) 23 0.3213 0.2006 0.0174 0.7579 
Utilities 
Leverage (market value) 23 0.2789 0.3655 0.0001 0.9727 
Textiles and Leverage(book value) 171 0.4263 0.2338 0 0.9895 
trade 
Leverage(market value) 170 0.5122 1 0 0.9998 
Services Leverage(book value) 52 0.3766 0.2196 0.0193 0.9082 
Leverage(market value) 52 0.4326 0.4034 0.0002 0.9998 
Leisure Leverage(book value) 82 0.3328 0.2203 0 0.8798 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regression Results on the Relationship between Leverage and Separation 
(Baseline Results) 
Dependent Variable: Book Leverage 
Independent 1 2 3 
Variable 
Control minus 0.0022*** 
ownership (0.0008) 
Control exceeds 0.0358*** 
ownership (0.0114) 
- 0 . 0 6 0 6 氺 氺 氺 
Ratio (0.0190) 
一1.4322氺氺氺 一1-4329氺氺氺 一I. 4208氺水* 
Profitability (q. 1320) (0. 1318) (0. 1323) 
Non-debt tax -0.4581 -0.4419 -0.4593 
shield (0.3059) (0.3060) (0.3072) 
0.0445*** 0.0442*** 0.0452*** 
Tangibility (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0089) 
0. 1114*** 0.1117*** 0. 1088*** 
Grow (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0280) 
0.0349*** 0.0348*** 0.0342*** 
Log size (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
-0.2672*** -0.2749*** -0. 1999*** 
Constant (0. (0.0629) (0.0625) 
R-squared 0.3245 0.3259 0.3230 
Number of 1434 1484 1484 
Observations 
Dependent Variable: Market Leverage 
Independent 1 2 3 
Variable 
Control minus 0.0018*** 
ownership (0.0007) 




-0.8937*** -0.8968*** -0.8867*** 
Profitability (q. 1088) (0.1089) (0.1096) 
Non-debt tax -0.7321** -0.7168** -0.7307** 
shield (0.2927) (0.2922) (0.2940) 
0 0731*** 0.0732*** 0.0734*** 
Tangibility (q. oi74) (0.0172) (0.0170) 
-0. 1821*林 -0. 1824*** -0. 1880*** 
Grow (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0191) 
. 0.0080** 0.0079** 0.0073* 
g s i z e (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Constant 0.1135** 0. 1125** 0. 1617*** 
64 
(0.0537) (0.0542) (0.0551) 
R-squared 0.7703 0.7703 0.7739 
；Jljmber of ^473 1473 1473 
Observations 
Note: The regressions are performed using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
specification. Numbers in parentheses are obtained standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity using regression with hc2 command in STATA. The dependent 
variables are book and market leverage ratio. Book leverage is defined as the book 
value of total debt divided by the book value of total debt plus the book value of total 
equity. Market leverage is defined as the book value of total debt divided by the book 
value of total debt plus the market value of total equity. The market value of total 
equity is defined as the number of outstanding shares multiplied by the share price of 
the last trading day of 1996. The main independent variable here is the separation of 
ownership from control. We use three different variables to measure this separation. 
They are Control minus Ownership, Control exceed Ownership and Ratio, 
respectively. Ratio is a variable which is defined as the share of cash-flow rights 
divided by the share of control rights in the hands of the largest shareholder. 
Non-debt tax shield is the ratio of depreciation to total assets. Profitability is the ratio 
of earnings before interest, taxes to book value of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio 
of total fixed assets to total assets. Log size is the logarithm of total assets. Industry 
dummies and country dummies are included in all regressions but not reported. 
•••Significant at the .01 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
*Significant at the .10 level. 
65 
Table 12 
Regression Results on the Relationship between Leverage and Separation 
(Robustness of Results) 
Dependent Variable: Book leverage 
Independent Variable 1 2 3 4 
"" ““"“！ “ 0.0019** 0.0022** 
Control minus ownership ⑴ . _ 9 ) ⑴ . q o o q ) 
Control exceeds 0.0308** 0.0383*** 
ownership (0.0137) (0.0123) 
. 0.0006 0.0001 0.0006 0.0003 
Ownership ( 0 . q q q q ) (q. ooo6) (0.0009) (0.0006) 
_ -0.0390** -0.0277 
lcash5 (0.0184) (0.0202) 
-0.0216 -0.0117 
TcashlO (0.0220) (0.0226) 
-0.0365 -0.0243 
IcashZU (0.0316) (0.0328) 
. . . -1.4357*** -1.4335*** -1.4377*** -1.4368*** 
Profitability (-0.1339) (-0.1332) (-0.1337) (-0.1332) 
M 」L -0.4588 -0.4605 -0.4463 -0.4475 
Non-debt tax shield (0.3041) (0.3045) (0.3045) (0.3049) 
0.0441*** 0.0445*** 0. 0439*** 0.0442*** 
Tangibility (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0086) 
0. 1116*** 0.1113*** 0. 1114*** 0.1115*** 
Grow (0.0272) (0.0275) (0.0272) (0.0274) 
. 0.0353*** 0.0349*** 0.0353*** 0.0350*** 
Log s i z e (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
-0.2530*** -0.2709*** -0. 2703*** -0.2858*** 
Constant (0.0688) (0.0665) (0.0715) (0.0672) 
R-squared 0.3264 0.3245 0.3270 0.3261 
Number of Observations 1484 U M i m 1484 
Dependent Variable: Market leverage 
Independent Variable 1 2 3 4 
0. 0022***""“0. 0024*** 
Control minus ownership ⑴.qoo?) (0.0007) 
Control exceeds 0. 0316*林 0.0328*** 
ownership (0.0118) (0.0116) 
. -0 .0001 0.0011** -0.0002 0.0011** 
加 n e r s h i p (0.0008) (0.0005) 0.0008 (0.0005) 
TcashS -0- 0286 -••0181 
icashb (0.0196) 0.0203 
TcashlO 0.0284 0.0379* 
IcashlO (0.0218) (0.0223) 
Tcash20 謝 0.0527* 
IcashZ" (0.0286) (0.0291) 
-0.8924*** -0.9062*** -0.8958*** -0.9109*** 
Profitability (0. 1083) (0. 1092) (0.1082) (0.1095) 
66 
、， 」， ， .1 , -0.7619*** -0.7580*** -0.7439** -o. 7388*** 
Non-debt tax shield (0.2932) (0.2955) (0.2923) (0.2948) 
0.0707林* 0. 0724*** 0. 0708*** 0. 0726*** 
Tangibility (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0168) (0.0166) 
-0.1814*** -0.1826*** -0. 1818*** -0. 1829*** 
(0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0187) 
. 0.0103*** 0.0089** 0.0102*** 0.0088** 
g s i z e (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
0. 0566 0. 0769 0. 0445 0. 0728 
Constant (0.0602) (0.0564) (0.0621) (0.0574) 
R-squared 0.7727 0.7709 0.7727 0.7710 
Number of Observations 1473 i m i m 1473 
Note: The regressions are performed using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
specification. Numbers in parentheses are obtained standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity using regression with hc2 command in Stata. The dependent 
variables are book and market leverage ratio. Book leverage is defined as the book 
value of total debt divided by the book value of total debt plus the book value of total 
equity. Market leverage is defined as the book value of total debt divided by the book 
value of total debt plus the market value of total equity. The market value of total 
equity is defined as the number of outstanding shares multiplied by the share price of 
the last trading day of 1996. The main independent variable here is the separation of 
ownership from control. We use three different variables to measure this separation. 
They are Control minus Ownership, Control exceed Ownership and Ratio, 
respectively. Ratio is a variable which is defined as the share of cash-flow rights 
divided by the share of control rights in the hands of the largest shareholder. 
Ownership and Tcash dummies are included as control variables. Ownership is the 
share of cash-flow rights held by the largest shareholder. Tcash is a set of dummy 
variables: (1) tcashS is a dummy variable equals one if cash-flow rights is larger than 
5% and smaller than 10%, and zero, otherwise;(2) tcash 10 is a dummy variable 
equals one if cash-flow rights is larger than 10% and smaller than 20%, and zero, 
otherwise; (3) tcash20 is a dummy variable equals one if cash-flow rights is larger 
than 20%, and zero, otherwise. Non-debt tax shield is the ratio of depreciation to 
total assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes to book value of 
total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. Log size is the 
logarithm of total assets. Industry dummies and country dummies are included in all 
regressions but not reported. 
•••Significant at the .01 level. 
**Significant at the .05 level. 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Summary Statistics of Liquidity and Ownership Structure Variables 
(Average value for the year of 1994 and 1995) 
V . ui M ^ ^ “ 75%•"“ 
Variable Name mean ^ ^., median 
Dev. quart lie quart lie 
Investment/K 0.09 0.33 0 0 0.02 
Cash flow/K 0.91 1.72 0. 14 0.47 1. 10 
Market to Book Ratio 1.76 10.89 0.37 0.55 0.78 
Sales/K 14073.80 93840.54 17.32 6530.82 12955.45 
Log size 18.40 1.79 17.33 18.41 19.64 
Ownership 11.28 12.16 3 5 17 
Control Rights 14.86 11.58 5 10 21 
Ratio 0.67 0.36 0.33 0.80 1 
Control minus ownership 3.57 4.62 0 2 6 
Control exceed ownership 0.65 0.48 0 1 1 
Note.. The dependent variable is Investment/K, where K is capital stock. Tobin's q is 
replaced by market to book ratio as an alternative. Cash flow/K is the ratio of net cash flow 
to capital stock. Ownership is the share of cash-flow rights held by the largest 
shareholder. Control rights are the voting rights in the hands of the largest shareholder. 
Ratio is ratio of cash flow rights to control rights. Control minus ownership is a variable 
measuring the simple difference between the share of control rights and the share of 
cash-flow rights in the hands of the largest shareholder. Control exceeds ownership is a 
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